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INSTITUTE OF LONDON v. SEA- LAND SERVICE, INC.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Ci rcuit, 4 August 1989
881 F.2d 761
In a contract for foreign carriage that is not statutori ly governed by but rather incorporates the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act, COGSA has the effect of a contractual term only, and inconsistent terms may therefore be gi ven force.
FACTS: A 45 foot yacht was carried aboard a cargo ship from
Taiwan to the port of Tacoma, Washington. The yacht was held
in a cradle on the deck of the ship during transit. During the
process of unloading the yacht in Tacoma, the yacht slipped
from its slings, fell into the water and was damaged.
The bill of lading for the shipment of the yacht incorporated by
reference the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act <"COGSA"l. COGSA
regulates the contractual terms of ocean carriage covered by
bills of lading and applies only to foreign carriage, meaning
between ports in the U.S., its possessions or territories, and
foreign ports.
The Act permits the parties to the bill of lading to incorporate
COGSA's terms in their contracts, even· where COGSA would
not apply under its own authority. For example, by agreement of
the parties, COGSA terms can be used for domestic carriage or
for goods not normally within COGSA's scope. Under COGSA,
liability for damage to shipped goods is limited to $500 per
"package" or per "customary freight unit" ( "CFU"l. The act
specifically defines "goods" so as to exclude cargo which by
contract is stated as being carried on deck and is so carried.
The Institute of London Underwriters Company and Ferguson
and Co., (the "cargo interests"> sued the carrier, Sea-Land
Services, and the stevedore, the Container Stevedorings Co.,
Inc., for damages to the yacht.
The district court found that COGSA could be applied to the
contract. Thus, as to the $500 limit on liability for "goods"
shipped per "package," the yacht was excluded from the per
package limitation because it was shipped on the deck of the
vessel. Therefore, the carrier may not rely on the $500 liability
limit for goods per package. As to the CFU, the court ruled, as a
matter of law, that the CFU is the unit upon which the cargo for
freight not shipped "per package'" is computed. Since Sea-Land
Services charges by the linear foot and the yacht was 45 feet
long, the court ruled Sea-Land's liability was 45 l the per foot
CFUl multiplied by $500, or $22,500.
The cargo interest appealed the ruling that applied COGSA to
the bill oflading thus limiting the liability for damages and also
the extension of limited liability to the stevedores. The carrier
and stevedore, together. cross-appealed the holding that the
yacht comprised 45 CFU. thus bringmg their liability to
$22,500 rather than s1mply :ii 500.

comprised of 45 CFU's?
ANALYSIS: As to the first issue, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit looked at how to incorporate inconsistent provisions
via-a-vis COGSA and secondly, the ability of the cargo interests
to opt out of the COGSA liability limit by declaration of a higher
cargo value. The court held that terms, inconsistent with
COGSA but which are otherwise valid contract terms, can be
given force when COGSA is incorporated into a contract for
foreign carriage but where COGSA would not otherwise apply
on its own authority.
To completely invoke COGSA, the court ruled that the carrier
and stevedores must also demonstrate that the shipper was
given a fair opportunity to "opt out" of the bill of lading liability
limits in order to enforce COGSA limits. The bill of lading
clearly presents prima facie evidence that this opportunity was
available by providing space for the shipper to declare a higher
value for the cargo and expressly stating that such declaration
eliminates the carrier's "package" liability limitations.
Further, the cargo interests failed to meet their burden of proving
that such an opportunity was denied to them. The court affirmed
the lower court's ruling imposing a limitation of liability for the
carrier under COGSA.
In deciding the question of extending liability limitations to
the stevedores, the court looked to the Himalaya Clause. In
admiralty, a Himalaya Clause is the language used in a contract
to extend the carrier's defenses and limitations of liability under
COGSA to agents and independent contractors. In this instance,
both courts found that the bill of lading clearly expressed the
intent of the carrier to extend liability limitations under
COGSA to the stevedores. The language was unambiguous and
the district court's extension of COGSA was affirmed.
Finally, the court held that the district court erred in its ruling
that the yacht should be considered a non-package good. Instead,
the court pointed to specific language in the bill of lading which
states that "defenses and limitations of < COGSA l shall apply to
goods whether carried on deck or under deck." Additionally, the
bill of lading limits liability of "goods" to $500 and then defined
"package" to include cargo shipped on a cradle.
The court found that the bill of lading covered the specific
situation which arose in the case. The court refused to allow
COGSA to preempt all contradictory contract terms when its sole
force was by incorporation into a contract for foreign transport.
The court reversed the district court's judgment based on a $500
limit per 45 CFU's or $$22,500. The case was remanded for
judgment in the amount of $500, representing the limitation of
liability on a single "package."

i l l Were terms used m the bill ofladmg and which
were inconsistent with the prov1s10ns of COGSA, preempted by
COGSA once 1t was invoked"'
1 2 1 Was the l imitation of liability under COGSA
properly extended to benefit the stevedores"!
1 3 1 Was the yacht a .. package·· or a non-package
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